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BOOK BEvmws
CRmIMNAL BEsPONsIBILTrY AND MErAL DIsEAsE. By C. R. Jeffery.
Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1967. Pp. 324. $11.00.
Criminal Responsibility and Mental Disease is a provocative book.
It is rich in case material, reports of courtroom behavior, and a dis-
cussion of the relationship of law, psychiatry, and the social sciences
to mental disease.
In the first half of the volume, Professor Jeffery considers the
Durham rule1 with respect to legal precedents, present interpretations,
and behavioral outcome. He notes that, "The Durham rule broadened
the meaning of insanity so that, within a legal framework, non-
psychotic psychopathology could be considered as insanity."2' Thus,
the Durham decision of 1954, "extends the meaning of insanity to
include any mental disease or mental defect."3
In order to investigate the consequences of Durham, a research
project was undertaken in the District of Columbia. This involved
"introducing an insanity plea for a condition less than psychotic, such
as alcoholism, homosexuality, drug addiction, or sociopathy" and
then analyzing the effects upon the government, defense counsel,
psychiatrists, the bench, jurors, and the defendant. More than twenty
cases involving the insanity plea were introduced and studied. As a
part of the project, thirty-six interviews with psychiatrists and twenty-
six interviews with lawyers were conducted.
The research findings demonstrated that the lawyers and psy-
chiatrists were divided as to the utility of the Durham rule. Most of
those interviewed found fault with that decision. In particular, dif-
ficulty was encountered within both professional groups in defining
mental disease. Jeffery found that judges generally oppose any ex-
tension of mental illness as a defense of crime, while counsel may
favor its utilization as a means of preventing the punishment of the
defendant. Of particular significance was the finding that the testi-
mony of defense-minded psychiatrists and government-biased psy-
chiatrists was closely related to their sponsorship. Regarding the in-
adequacy of psychiatrists as expert witnesses, the author states: "The
psychiatrist is placed in an impossible situation so long as he has to
testify as an expert witness for [either] the government or for the
defense."4
Finally, with regard to Durham and its relationship to criminal
behavior, general conclusions and recommendations are advanced:
1 United States v. Durham, 214 F. 2d 862 (D. C. Cir. 1954).
2C. JEFFERY, CRImiNAL R.EPoNsiBIrY AND MENTAL DSEA E 17 (1967).
3 Id. at 42.
4 Id. at 27.
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We do not know how to cure or treat antisocial behavior, though the
Durham rule assumes that such knowledge exists. The Durham rule does
not reform the criminal nor protect society.
Serious due process issues are raised by the Durham rule.
The insanity defense defines crime as a medical problem; it therefore
ignores the fact that crime is a social problem, not a medical problem.5
The second half of Professor Jeffery's book consists of a more
general dissertation on criminal behavior and mental disease as pre-
sented by psychological and sociological theorists. He notes that dif-
fering opinions exist as to what constitutes mental disease; the author
believes that crime is not caused by mental illness. Rather, Jeffery
views crime as behavior which is learned.
Indeed, the book was provocative. It prompted this reviewer to
ask: Is not the proper province of law, the courtroom? As surgery
takes place in a specialized hospital setting, and teaching essentially
remains a structured process undertaken in a controlled institution
(not without creating another set of problems), so the practice of
criminal law seems to be a definite and restricted process-to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of particular persons who happen to
be brought before the court.
The broader philosophical and empirical questions of correcting
the wrong of society, providing medical treatment for prisoners and
citizens, establishing the efficacy of particular laws, or unraveling the
reasons why some persons in every society commit criminal acts, all
transcend the law, although they may be related to it. This is not to
say that scientific studies of the law should not be undertaken. Quite
the contrary. Professor Jefferey has certainly shown that such in-
vestigations are feasible and productive. But the law is not science;
it does not employ the scientific method. It seems, therefore, that
studies of criminal behavior will of necessity transcend the legal frame-
work and be organized around the methods and concepts of the
developing behavioral sciences.
John C. Ball, Ph. D.
Chief, Sociology Unit
National Institute of Mental Health
Addiction Research Center
Lexington, Kentucky
5 Id. at 292-93.
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